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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNFAIR
PRACTICES ACTS
By Jeannette E. Thatcher*

Some serious constitutional problems have arisen in those
states' adopting legislation directed against the unfair competitive
practices of locality price discrimination and selling below cost,
or use of "loss leaders." Prompted by small businessmen's animosity toward these ruinous depression-stirred tactics and fostered
by the general dread of monopolistic tendencies and their economic effects, statutes variously designated, inter alia, as Unfair
Practices Acts, Fair Sales Acts, and Anti-price Discrimination Acts,
have appeared in twenty-eight states in the last decade. The
California Unfair Practices Act of 1935, as amended in 1937, was
one of the earlier enactments and has served as a model for many
of the later acts.
The vigor of the motivating forces in operation here is shown
not only by the rapid spread of this type of legislation, but also
by the extemporaneous draftsmanship apparent in the statutes
themselves. Not a few states,2 in their legislative haste, perpetuated
a typographical error appearing in the California act in the section
*Graduate student in law, Law School, University of Minnesota.
'Sales below cost only: Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia (11).
Price discrimination only: Delaware, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri,
South Dakota, Vermont (6).
Both: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming (19).
2 C. C. H. Trade Regulation Service (9th Ed. 1944) 7503, f[ 8000 et seq.
2
E.g., Wyoming. See State v. Langley, infra footnote 65.
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relating to the interpretation of the act inadvertently calling for
"literal" instead of "liberal" construction.
Unfortunately, in the precipitancy more grave and fundamental
inaccuracies and inadequacies commonly persisted in the Unfair
Practices Acts. As a result, several of the acts have been declared
unconstitutional, principally as violations of due process. 3 Others
have been partially invalidated, and the constitutionality of nearly
all is open to grave doubt.
It is the purpose of this article to review generally the bases
upon which unconstitutionality of the unfair trade practices acts
has been most successfully predicated, with special emphasis on
the sales below cost provisions, and to examine critically the present
statutes of Minnesota and of Oregon 4 in the light of the principles
deduced. The most prolific source of perplexity in evaluating the
constitutionality of these acts has been the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and discussion here will be limited to the following phases of that specific
constitutional problem:
(1) Is the prohibition of sales below cost within the legislative
prerogatives of the states under the police power?
(2) Are the statutory requirements relating to the nature of
the dealer's intent in making the prohibited sales consistent with
due process?
3The history of the Minnesota legislation on the subjects of locality price
discrimination and sales below cost has been turbulent. A statute prohibiting

locality discrimination in the dairy business, Minn. Laws 1921, ch. 305, G. S.
Minn. 1923, sec. 3907, was held unconstitutional in Fairmont Creamery Co.
v. Minnesota, (1927) 274 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 506, 71 L. Ed. 893. A contempo-

raneous statute, Minn. Laws 1921, ch. 413, G. S. Minn. 1923, secs. 10464 to
10467, prohibiting locality discrimination generally was repealed by Minn.
Laws 1937, ch. 116. The 1937 act was held unconstitutional in part in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, (D.C. Minn. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 70.
Next the legislature in order to correct the constitutional defects pointed out
in the Ervin case amended the 1937 act by Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 403, codified
as Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., 1940 Supp., secs. 3976-37 to 3976-49. The 1939
act was interpreted in McElhone v. Geror, (1940) 207 Minn. 580, 292 N. W.
414, and in McFadden Lambert Co. v. Winston & Newell Co., (1941) 209
Minn. 245, 296 N. W. 18. Still another act was passed, Minn. Laws 1941, ch.
326, codified as 1 Minn. Stat. 1941, secs. 325.01 to 325.07, secs. 325.48, 325.49,
and 4325.52, to clarify uncertainties brought to light by those cases.
The Oregon act has not yet become a subject of judicial concern, although the Attorney-General has several times given an opinion touching
upon some of its provisions. In Reports of Oregon Attorney-General, 19381940, p. 509, and in Reports of Oregon Attorney-General, 1940-1942, p. 61,
he ruled that the anti-discrimination act does not apply to photographers and
to barbers, respectively. In Reports of Oregon Attorney-General, 1936-1938,
p. 187, he ruled that the exemption of lumber and lumber products from the
act, and the use of the expression "food commerce" did not render the act
unconstitutional, and that the 6% provision discussed infra, text following
footnote 76, was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
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(3) Does the statutory description of the acts constituting offenses possess that certainty and definiteness necessary in a penal
statute ? r
THE POLICE POWER

Early in the judicial interpretation of sales below cost prohibitions it was felt that such provisions were of a "price-fixing"
nature and accordingly beyond the police power of a state, unless
the businesses regulated were properly to be regarded as "affected
with a public interest." In Balser v. Caler,6 the California District
Court of Appeal gave its opinion that the California Act as applied
to a grocery business was unconstitutional because such a business
7
is not one so affected.
Later, when in Nebbia v. New York8 the U. S. Supreme Court
liberalized the concept of businesses affected with a public interest,
this argument was rendered substantially ineffective because, the
legislature having power to regulate businesses whenever the means
adopted were reasonably directed toward an evil reasonably conceived to exist, it was clear that there existed in the unfair practice
field at least a sufficiently debatable area of economic evil to give
the legislature power to experiment with regulation.
In 1938 the California Supreme Court in Wholesale Tobacco
DealersBureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., Inc.,9 found the
California statute invulnerable to this attack by an equivocation
between two theories. The court explained the principles of Nebbia
v. New York20 and found the Unfair Practices Act to be a sufficient
compliance therewith, even as a price-fixing act. Thereupon the
court expressed the view that neverthless the act was not of a
"price-fixing" nature, on the ingenious though somewhat tenuous
theory that the prohibition against sales below cost merely fixes
a floor beneath which prices may not go, the seller's discretion in
fixing his price remaining otherwise untrammeled.
Since the time of the Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Decision the
5
It is not suggested that the above list is exhaustive of tenable constitutional objections in any particular case. Other issues which may possibly
arise include impairment of the obligation of contracts, burdening of interstate
commerce,
and violation of equal protection or of state uniformity clauses.
6
(Cal. App. 1937) 74 P. (2d) 839, aff'd on other grounds, (1938) 11 Cal.
(2d) 663, 82 P. (2d) 19. This case was a companion case of Wholesale
Tobacco
Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., infra footnote 9.
7
Accord: State ex rel. English v. Rubak, (1938) 135 Neb. 335, 281
N. W. 607.
8(1934) 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940.
9(1938) 11 Cal. (2d) 634, 82 P. (2d) 3, 118 A. L. R. 486.
loSupra, footnote 8.
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courts have uniformly held these statutes to be within the power of
the legislature, either upon the ground that they are not- "pricefixing" acts,'1 or upon the ground that they satisfy the tests laid
down in Nebbia v. New York, 12 or upon some combination of both
such grounds. 13 Accordingly, at the present time it seems safe to
assume that the type of legislation under discussion is no longer
vulnerable to the criticism that it is beyond the domain of the police
power, and that these statutes are valid unless they are arbitrary or
unreasonable for some other reason.
II
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF INTENT

Some states have enacted statutes containing flat prohibitions
of sales below cost, with no indication that a particular kind of
intent on the part of the seller is necessary to constitute the offense.
In Commonwealth v. Zasloff,14 the court considered the constitutionality of the 1937 Pennsylvania Fair Sales Act, Section 2 of
which provided: "It is hereby declared that the advertisement, offer
for sale, or sale of any merchandise at less than cost by retailers
or wholesalers is prohibited."' 15 There was no reference either in
the title of the act or in any other section to the effect of the proscribed conduct upon competition. The court concluded that such
a "sweeping prohibition," alleviated only by exceptions of certain
types of sales of only a "minor nature," was unconstitutional, since
selling merchandise below cost is in general "an innocent and
legitimate practice, and subject to abuse only in occasional circumstances."' 6 The court expressed its opinion that, if the act
had "confined itself to prohibiting sales below cost when intended
to destroy competition, it would undoubtedly be valid . . ."17
State ex rel. Lief v. Packard-Bamberger& Co.,'$ which was
relied upon in the Zasloff case, had construed a statute 9 containing
"Carroll v. Schwartz, (1940) 127 Conn. 126, 14 Atl. (2d) 754; Rust v.
Griggs, (1938) 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S. W. (2d) 733; State v. Langley, (1938)
53 Wyo.
332, 84 P. (2d) 767, 775.
12State v. Walgreen Drug Co., (1941) 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P. (2d) 651;
Moore v. Northern Kentucky Independent Food Dealers Ass'n, (1941) 286
Ky. 24, 149 S. W. (2d) 755; McElhone v. Geror, (1940) 207 Minn. 580, 292
N. W.
414.
' 3 Associated Merchants of Montana v. Ormesher, (1939) 107 Mont. 530,
86 P. (2d) 1031; State v. Sears, (1940) 4 Wash. (2d) 200, 103 P. (2d) 337.
'4(1940) 338 Pa. 457, 13 Atl. (2d) 67, 128 A. L. R. 1120.
1Pa., 73 Purdons Stat. Ann., sec. 202.
16(1940) 13 Atl. (2d) 67, 70.
17Ibid.
28(1939) 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 Atl. (2d) 291.
:'N. J. Stat. Ann., secs. 56:4 to 56:7.
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a provision identical with Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Act. The
New Jersey court had discussed the absence of any requirement
of intent in conjunction with other offense elements found to be
vague and uncertain, concluding that the proscribed conduct was
not so clearly described that a person could kn6w what course was
lawful, and that action against an alleged offender thereunder
would be arbitrary and unreasonable.
Both the Pennsylvania and the New Jersey cases rely upon
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. M1finnesota,2 0 wherein an early Minnesota statute 21 was tested which prohibited locality discrimination
with respect to prices paid by buyers of milk and other dairy
products for manufacture or resale. There the U. S. Supreme
Court had invalidated the statute, holding, inter alia, that, since
the inhibition of the statute applied irrespective of motive, the
statute was invalid as an obvious attempt to
destroy defendant's
22
liberty to enter freely into normal contracts.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court long
ago upheld an anti-price discrimination act containing as an element
of the offense a clear and specific requirement of intent. In Central
Lumber Co. v. South Dakota23 the South Dakota Act was sustained
as against the arguments, first, that it denied equal protection
by its indefensible classifications, and second, that it unreasonably
limited liberty of contract. The statute prohibited locality price
discrimination by anyone committing the acts described ".

.

. in-

tentionally, for the purpose of destroying the competition of any
regular established dealer in such commodity, or to prevent the
competition of any person who in good faith intends and attempts
to become such dealer..

."

The due process clause was apparently

not argued, but in discussing the second argument the court said
that ".

.

. the law does not otherwise encounter the Fourteenth

Amendment ..."25
0-(1927) 274 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 506, 71 L. Ed. 893, 52 A. L. R. 163.
21Minn.Laws 1909, ch. 468, amended Minn. Laws 1921, ch. 305, and Minn.
Laws 21923, ch. 120.
2 The court relied in part upon Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana,
(1929) 278 U. S. 235, 49 S. Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed. 287, and Tyson & Bro. United
Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed.
718, and other early price-fixing cases following the early narrow concept of
"affected with a public interest," since liberalized by Nebbia v. New York,
(1934) 291 U. S.502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940. The extent to which this
fact should be regarded as weakening the Pairmont decision on the point
here involved (and hence the Pennsylvania, New Jersey and other cases relying thereon) is problematical.
23(1912) 226 U. S. 157, 33 S. Ct. 66, 57 L. Ed. 164.
24S. D., Laws 1907, ch. 131.
25(1912) 226 U. S.157, 162, 33 S.Ct. 66, 57 L. Ed. 164.
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There is a group of statutes containing a provision which apparently requires an element of intent to constitute the offense of
unfair trade practices, but which is couched in much broader
language than that of the South Dakota statute. The 1939 Maryland Act, considered in Daniel Loughran Company, Inc. v. Lord
Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Company, Inc.,2 prohibited advertisements, offers or sales below cost
"with the intent, effect, or result of unfairly diverting trade from
or otherwise injuring a competitor, or with the result of deceiving any purchaser or prospective purchaser, substantially lessening competition, unreasonably restraining trade, or tending to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
The Maryland court declared the act unconstitutional because
this provision, together with others found to be fatally indefinite
in themselves, rendered the language so general that "it may embrace not only acts commonly recognized as reprehensible, but also
others which it is unreasonable to presume were intended to be
made criminal.

..

27

The court observed:

"When the far-reaching effect of such legislation is visualized, one
is startled at its possibilities. Geographical equations have no
standing in the Act, and no trader embraced in its provisions can
conduct his business at any time with any degree of certainty that
he is not violating the law

...

,,2

Again, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. z. ErVin29 the court
disapproved the second paragraph of Sec. 2, Part 2, ch. 116, Minn.
Laws 1937, prohibiting locality discrimination "where the effect
of such lower prices may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of business, or to injure,
destroy or prevent competition with the person selling at such
lower prices . . . " Pointing out that the prohibition applied ir-

respective of the actual intent of the merchant, the court held that
the legislature had no power to declare honest price differentials,
based upon real differences in sales costs, to be illegal, since the
effect of the provision was to discriminate arbitrarily and unfairly
between merchants owning a store in only one locality and those
owning a store in each of several localities.8 0
26(1940) 178 Md. 38, 12 Atl. (2d) 201.
27(1940) 178 Md. 38, 51, quoting 16 C. 3. 67, 12 Atl. (2d) 201, 205.
2
SId. at 51.
29(D. C. Minn. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 70, 76-78.
3
OThe federal court also struck down a paragraph making sales at less
than 10% above manufacturer's list price, less published discounts, prima facie
evidence of violation of the act since the provision made no distinction between the probative value of such evidence on the two distinct elements of the
offense. The court conceded the reasonableness of an inference of sale below

UNFAIR PRACTICES ACTS

Similarly, the Nebraska court in State ex rel. English v. Ruback 31 invalidated the sales below cost portion of the 1937 Nebraska
Unfair Practices Act which illegalized those sales "where the effect
of such sale below cost . . . may lessen, injure, destroy, prevent,
hinder or suppress the competition of competitors . . ." The court

stressed the presence of the word "may" as comprehending all
possible rather than all reasonably probable consequences. Hence
the clause so widened the field of illegal acts that the act violated
due process by reason of its indefiniteness. Another section of the
same act, in which locality price discrimination was prohibited,
was contrasted in dictum as containing a more adequate requirement of intent.2
It is to be noted that none of these cases seem to regard intent
per se as a constitutionally essential element of the offense of unfair trade practice. Yet wherever intent was not made indispensable
by the statute itself, in the sense that an injurious effect upon
competition might be substituted therefor, the court found the
statute fatally indefinite.
In McElhone v.Geror,33 the Minnesota court expressly stated
that the absence of a requirement of intent as essential to violation was not fatal to the 1939 Act, but that sales below cost which
have the effect of injuring competition may be prohibited regardless of intent. The court then considered other aspects of the
statute, with a view to determining whether it was sufficiently
definite and certain. Nevertheless, since demurrer had admitted
allegations sufficient to show violation by defendant of the sales
below cost provision, the court did not have the help of evidence,
as did the Nebraska and federal courts in the cases just discussed.
Accordingly, its conclusion that the statute is sufficiently definite
cost, but pointed out that the fact would have no bearing upon the presence
or absence of the intent found to be a part of violation of the particular section
of the statute involved.
31(1938) 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607. The Federal Trade Commission
has expressed an opposite view with respect to the words "may be" in Sec. 2
of the Clayton Act, since amended by Sec. 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, stating that "it is tenzdency and probable effect rather than the actual results that are important," and that the words indicate "neither bare possibility,
nor certainty, but probability, to be deduced from the intent or inherent character of the acts themselves." In the Matter of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
(Mar. 5, 1936) 22 F. T. C. 232, 331.
Company,
:"2Cf. State v. 20th Century 'Market, (1940) 236 Wis. 215, 294 N. W.
873, where the act allegedly violated read "intent or effect" but the defendant was charged with intent to do the prohibited acts. Since neither
intent nor effect was found proved, defendant was discharged without consideration of constitutional issues.
33
(1940) 207 Minn. 580, 292 N. W. 414.
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and certain necessarily relates to the limited circumstances presented in the complaint. Indeed, the court virtually reserved an
opinion on at least two phases of uncertainty argued, stating, e.g.:
".. . On this point the statute is definite and certain, eniough so,
anyway, to fend off the present attack so far as it proceeds upon
the suppositionthat it is otherwise."34
An interesting treatment of a statute similarly containing the
language "intent or effect" is found in State v. Walgreen Drug
Co.35 The defendant there urged that the statute was invalid since
it imposed civil and penal liability on those violating its provisions
without criminal intent. But the court upheld the statute, holding
that "the only reasonable implication from the entire language of
the chapter" was that criminal intent was an essential ingredient
of violation. Two cases were cited as examples of similar statutory
construction, neither of which seems adequate authority for disregarding the plain words "or effect." 36 It may be inferred that
the court feared that a construction giving the clause "intent or
effect" full meaning would result in unconstitutionality37
Two other cases concerning themselves with the intent requirement in the Unfair Practice Acts are worthy of mentibn.3 In both
cases the statute was judicially aided as against the argument that
the absence of the requirement was fatal. In Wholesale Tobacco
Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 39 the section
34(1940) 207 Minn. 580, 589, 292 N. W. 414, 419 (Italics supplied.).
35(1941) 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P. (2d) 651.
3
GIn People v. Kahn, (1936) 19 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 60 P. (2d) 596,
the statutory language was entirely dissimilar, and all that was necessary
for a clear requirement was judicial insertion of a comma separating the
intent clause from the last item in a parallel series of prohibited acts. In
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, (1918) 246 U. S. 343, 38 S.Ct. 323, 62 L. Ed.
763, the grazing statute in question was supplemented by a general statute
requiring either intent or criminal negligence as an element of every
crime.
37Cf. (1942) 36 Ill. L. Rev. 682, 686, note, criticizing the Arizona court
for condemning "a state of mind, not a business evil."
3
sRelated to the problem of the necessity of an intent requirement is
an interesting problem which has been excluded from the scope of this article:
where the statute requires an intent to injure competitors, to what extent
may proof of the necessary intent be aided by statutory presumptions? One
of the two judges dissenting seriatim in People v. Pay Less Drug Store
(1944) 25 Cal. (2d) 108, 128, 153 P. (2d) 9, 20, pointed out that a specific
intent as distinguished from a general criminal intent must be shown, and
argued that accordingly a section of the statute by which the intent was
presumed upon proof of commission of the act together with proof of injurious effect was invalid. Cf. the discussion in (1938) 32 Ill. *L. Rev. 816,
824-827.
39
Supra, footnote 8.
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attacked actually contained a requirement of purposeful violation,
although the qualifying clause was not clearly separated from the
last of the series of prohibited acts immediately preceding the purpose clause. The court judicially inserted a comma, holding, pursuant to well recognized rules of statutory construction, that the
phrase modified each of the members of the series-an unexceptionable result.

40

The second case, Rust v. Griggs,41 held intent was a necessary
ingredient despite the fact that Sec. 3 of the Tennessee act, in
defining the offense, made no mention of such a requirement. That
section did, however, condemn sales "in contravention of the policy
of this Act" and Sec. 2 of the Act in describing that policy made
it sufficiently clear that it was only acts done with the "intent or
effect" of injuring competitors which were penalized. The construction of the interpolated language "or effect" was neither called
for nor volunteered by the court, because demurrer had admitted
an allegation averring sales by defendant with intent to impair
competition.
Summarizing the aggregate effect of the decisions relating to
statutory requirements of intent discussed in Part II of this article,
it is submitted that the likelihood that a given act will be held constitutional has a direct relation to the extent of restriction in this
portion of the penalizing statute. It may be admitted that due
process probably does not impose upon state legislatures the necessity of including conscious intent to do wrong as an element of
statutory offenses. 42 However, due process does require that all
crimes be designated in language sufficiently definite and certain
to inform a person of ordinary understanding what course of conduct he may lawfully pursue.4
Whenever the legislature departs
from the standard of subjective guilt-in these cases some form of
conscious intent to accomplish harm to competitors-then in the
circumstances peculiarly surrounding these cases, it is submitted
that such a multitude of possibilities reasonably gains admittance
to the realm of prohibited statutory acts that the unconstitutionality
of the act is virtually assured. The next section hereof is devoted
to discussion of the types of uncertainties which may arise.
40
Accord: People v. Kahn, supra, footnote 36; Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Ervin, supra, footnote 29.
41(1938) 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S. W. (2d) 733.
4
2Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939 Ed.) sec. 315, pp. 763-765.
4
31d. at sec. 316, pp. 765-767.
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III
INDEFINITENESS AND UNCERTAINTY OF COST PROVISIONS

A.

Cases Denying Constitutionality

In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v Ervin,4 the Minnesota
statute under attack, Minn. Laws 1937, ch. 116, contained two
paragraphs specifically directed to defining the term "cost" and the
phrase "cost of doing business" respectively.
Part II, Sec. 3, Par. 3, Subsec. 1 provided: "The term 'cost'
as applied to the wholesale or retail vendor shall mean: (1) Where
a manufacturer publishes a list price, cost shall be the manufacturer's
list price less his published discounts plus the cost of doing business
by said vendor..."
Part II, Sec. 3, Par. 4 provided: "The 'cost of doing business'
or 'overhead expense' is defined as the average of all costs of doing
business incurred in the conduct of such business during the calendar
year immediately preceding any alleged violation of this Act ...
and must include without limitation the following items of expense...
Both paragraphs were held by the federal court to be unconstitutional, the third because it arbitrarily required the merchant
to adopt as his cost for the purposes of the act a sum which might
or might not be his actual cost. The evidence showed that the
manufacturer's list prices reduced by published discounts did not
always correspond with the prices paid by retailers but that the
market price in the retail grocery business fluctuated more rapidly
than the list price. The fourth paragraph was held objectionable
on the ground that it took no account of the current selling costs
of a merchant who had accomplished a reduction in his overhead
at any time during the year, either by revolutionizing his accounting or sales basis, or by improving his efficiency. Since the statute
foreclosed all attempts to show that current selling costs at the
time of asserted illegal sales had varied from the yearly average,
the provision was regarded as unreasonable and unconstitutional.
The court indicated that the statute might have been sustained had
only prima facie evithe preceding year's average been 4made
5
dence of the merchant's current costs.
44

Supra, footnote 29.

45Accord: McElhone v. Geror, (1940)

207 Minn. 580, 587, 292 N. W.
414, 418. Here the Minnesota court sustained the two provisions after
modification so that the manufacturer's list price, less published discount,
and the preceding year's average of overhead expense were merely prima
facie evidence of the merchant's cost.
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In Commonwealth v.Zasloffp6 section 1 (a) of the Pennsylvania
statute defined "cost to the retailer" as the actual consideration
paid for the merchandise, or alternatively, as the consideration
necessary for replacement, the latter to be determined ".

. by ap-

plying to said merchandise the same cost per unit as the last quantity purchased by the retailer prior to the said sale of said merchandise would have cost per unit if bought at the most favorable
market price available to the retailer at any time within thirty (30)
days prior to the said sale, whichever is lower, less any customary
trade discounts, but exclusive of discounts for cash." 47
The court expressed the view that this language set a standard
for differentiation of criminal and legitimate sales so vague, indefinite and incapable of practical application that this in itself
would make enforcement of the statute a violation of due process.
The court took the position that the alternative method was unreasonable in requiring the merchant to ascertain cost by an exhaustion of every possible source of inquiry to find the most
favorable market price which would have been available to him over
so long a period as thirty days.4" Similarly, the statute involved in
State ex rel. Lief v.Packard-Bamberger49 contained a definition of
"cost to the retailer" substantially identical with the alternative
method of determination set forth in the Pennsylvania act. The New
Jersey court, in holding the act fatally indefinite, commented briefly
upon the lack of clarity in the standard for determining cost.
In State v. Walgreen Drug Co., supra, the court passed upon
the constitutionality of Arizona Laws 1929, c. 39, which contained
an interpretation clause qualifying the general definition of "cost"
to retailer or wholesaler, partially withdrawing the standard by
providing that "purchases made

. . .

at a price which cannot be

justified by prevailing market conditions within this state shall not
be used in determining cost. . .

."

The court held that part of the

definition to be so indefinite and uncertain as to be arbitrary and
unreasonable. The same or a similar clause was also contained in
the New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes, which were
4GSupra, footnote 14.
47Pa., 73 Purdon's Stat. Ann., sec. 201.
4
sThese observations constituted dicta, however, for the court expressly designated them as "unnecessary" and rested the decision upon the
ground hereinabove discussed, text, at footnotes 14-17.
5
Su pra, footnote 18.
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all found50 to be invalid. 51 Of the four courts, the Maryland court,
speaking in Daniel Loughran Co., Inc. v. Lord Baltimore Candy &
Tobacco Co., Inc., most clearly expressed the potential injustices
latent in the objectionable phrase:
"Upon the dealer who would avoid transgressing the law there
is thus placed the burden of first ascertaining what are the 'existing
market conditions,' then determining whether those conditions
justify a certain price, and finally, upon the assumption that his
analysis is correct and his judgment sound, utilizing that figure as
a basis for his cost computation....
"It matters not that he acted in good faith....
"The dealer takes a chance, and if he has accurately judged
market conditions, and the relativity -of prices to those conditions,
but if not, he is open to its consequences,
he is clear of the law;
52
criminal and civil."

While the four courts were unanimous in condemning the clause,
two of them were not in agreement as to the effect upon the statute
of its deficiency.53 The Maryland court declared that the provision,
relating as it did to the method of computing cost, was a vital part
of the foundation of the legislative structure, concluding (despite
the severability clause) that the other sections fell with the invalid
interpretation clause. On the other hand, the Arizona court in the
Walgreen Drug Co. Case merely invalidated the definitive clause,
taking the view that, because the different provisions were by the
act expressly declared to be severable, the entire act was not necessarily vitiated, but that the chapter was "workable" with the objectionable portion of the definition eliminated.
Another clause frequently found in the unfair practices acts
provides in substance that the statute shall not apply to sales made
to meet the "legal prices of a competitor selling the same articles
5

OState ex rel. Lief v. Packard-Bamberger Co., supra footnote 18;
Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., supra footnote 26; Commonwealth v. Zasloff, supra footnote 46.
51
In Rust v. Griggs, (1938) 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S. W. (2d) 733, an
identical provision was attacked, not on the basis of indefiniteness, which
was not mentioned, but on the ground that it burdened interstate commerce
by denying the right to use as a basis for his selling cost the invoice cost
on goods purchased by the merchant in another state on a market lower
than that in Tennessee. The court construed "market conditions" as a
broad enough term to include purchase prices of goods on sale in neighboring states, concluding that the legislature intended merely to exclude exceptional sale prices irrespective of the locale of the sale.
52(1940) 178 Md. 38, 47-48, 12 Atl. (2d) 201, 205-206.
5
3In the New Jersey and Pennsylvania cases the question did not arise
since the statutes were invalid in their entireties for other reasons discussed
hereinabove, text at footnotes 14-19.
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in the same locality or trade area." Some of the statutes do 5' and
some do not include in the clause the words "in good faith." This
clause came into question in the New Jersey and Pennsylvania cases
just mentioned, and both courts felt that a merchant could not
know whether he would incur the penalties of the statute by lowering his price to that of a competitor unless he could examine the
books of the competitor to determine whether the competitive price
was "legal." Under the Nmv Jersey view, good faith in meeting the
price, believing it to be a "legal" price would be no defense if in
fact it was not "legal."
The words "same locality or trade area" in this clause may likewise prove fatally indefinite under the theory of State v. Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey.55 In that case the words "locality," "community," "section," and "section of a locality," etc., were condemned
as used in a provision prohibiting locality price discrimination. The
unfair practice acts do not attempt to indicate what geographical
areas would be included within such terms. Two places of business
side by side probably would be regarded by all as situated in the
same "locality" or "trade area" but if the establishments were
separated by the distance of one city block or even by the width
of a busy street, the matter would become doubtful.r8
B. Cases 4ffirming Constitutionality
The early case of Rust v. Griggs5 7 held Tennessee's unfair practice act sufficiently definite to be constitutional in spite of its definition of "cost to the retailer" as the lower of the following:
"(1) the purchase price of the product or commodity to the retailer at the retail outlet when invoice is dated not more than 60
days prior to the sale of such product or commodity by the retailer,
or (2) the replacement cost of such product or commodity . . . at
the time of sale ... plus a mark up amounting to (not) less than

the minimum cost of distribution by the most efficient retailer, which
mark up, in the absence of proof to the contrary, shall be six per
cent (6%).""8

It was argued with respect to (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment
was violated because a retailer who bought on a low market and
kept his merchandise for more than 60 days would be required to
54California, Minnesota, Oregon, inter alia.

55(1940) 195 S.C.267, 10 S. E. (2d) 778.
5GThis issue was raised in McElhone v. Geror, see text at footnotes
33-34, but the court, though doubting the effectiveness of the argument,
equivocated and came to no clear decision.
7(1938) 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S. W. (2d) 733, supra footnote 51
5"Tenn., Williams Tenn. Code Anno., Sec. 6770.7 (a).
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advance his prices above a reasonable profit in order to avoid violation. The court rejected the contention, holding that the exception
of bona fide clearance sales, and other isolated transactions, would
permit sale of the old stock at any price selected by the merchant.
Subdivision (2) was held to be sufficiently definite though it required ascertainment of the cost of distribution of "the most efficient retailer." The court said the words were used in a generic
sense and not to designate any particular individual, observing that:
"To ascertain such cost of distribution is no great task. Matters
of that sort are readily available in numerous trade surveys contained in trade journals and other publications." 9
Two years later in State v. Sears0 the constitutionality of the
Washington act came into question, one of the provisions challenged
being similar to the clauses held invalid in the Zasloff and PackardBanberger Cases, sitpra. The provisions permitted "the meeting in
good faith of a legal competitive price." The court distinguished
both of those cases on the ground that the New Jersey and Pennsylvania statutes, unlike the Washington act, contained no requirement of intent as an element of the offense. Accordingly, the court
concluded that, since any sales in violation of the Washington act
must be made with intent to destroy competition, "if a merchant
in good faith reduces his prices to meet those of a competitor, who
he in good faith believes has a legal price, he will not be violating
either the intent or the wording of the act." 61 The California court
in People v. Pay Less Drug Store took the same position, adopting
the reasoning and some of the language of the Sears Case, although
decision of the point was not strictly necessary under the fairly
strong facts of the California case.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the Washington view in effect
deletes from the statute the word "legal." If the legislative intent
was truly interpreted by the court, inclusion of the word "legal"
was nothing more than the use of a meaningless adjective and indicative of careless statutory draftsmanship. Yet if the term was
used advisedly by the legislature, and the court's purpose in deleting
it was to save the statute from fatal indefiniteness, the propriety of
the course is doubtful and greater candor on the part of the court
would certainly be desirable.
59(1938) 172 Tenn. 565, 574, 113 S. W. (2d) 733, 736.

60(1940) 4 Wash. (2d) 200, 103 P. (2d) 337.

61(1940) 4 Wash. (2d) 200, 217, 103 P. (2d) 337, 345. There was a
vigorous dissent in which the position was taken that the act was clearly invalid for uncertainty.
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Although Rust v. Grigs and State v. Sears are inconsistent
with the cases invalidating similar unfair practices acts, neither is a
strong authority. In the Sears Case, the question having arisen on
demurrer to the complaint, the defendant stood on his demurrer
when it was overruled. The Washington court stated:
"If we had before us a proper factual background, we might
more easily determine whether or not the terms 'cost' and 'cost of
doing business,' as defined in chapter 221, are too uncertain and indefinite to reasonably be applied by any merchant, but we have
in this case only the language of the statute and we are not prepared
to say at this time, judged by the language of the statute alone, that
simple and proper accounting practices will not disclose the necessary information...."6- 2
Similarly, in Rust v. Griggs the case came before the court on
the allegations of a bill admitted by demurrer, and without factual
color and background. The averments showed a strong case for injunction in that the defendant was alleged to be employing deceptive
advertising, misleading the public and unfairly diverting trade from
competitors by use of the slogan: "Pay Cash; Pay Less"-whereas,
except for the loss leaders complained of, many of the items advertised were sold at prices substantially above the prevailing price.
In addition, the Rust Case was one of the first cases ruling on the
constitutionality of the unfair practices acts and did not have the
benefit of the ideas and arguments adduced in later cases. 63
The California case, Wholesale Tobacco DealersBureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., supra, which is usually cited as upholding the constitutionality of the local act, is not to be regarded as
precluding the possibility that that act is fatally indefinite, for the
court found it unnecessary to decide the question. It is possible
to infer that the court doubted the seriousness of the argument, but
the court excused itself on the basis of the finding of the lower
court, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, that the defendant had
sold the goods involved at less than invoice or replacement cost,
plus cost of doing business. It was further stipulated that the cost
of doing business in defendant's line of activity was an established
fact. The court observed:
"Under such circumstances the issue cannot and should not be
62(1940) 4 Wash. (2d) 200, 214, 103 P. (2d) 337, 344.

63

The only case called to the attention of the court was People v. Kahn,
(Cal. App. 1936) 60 P. (2d) 596, 599, in which the California court conceded that "in many cases it is going to be extremely difficult to determine
what the cost of an article is. We are of the opinion, however, that the
difficulty will be a factual one, that of discovering the cost, as a truth, and
not a legal one, that of discovering what the Legislature meant by the term."
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determined in this proceeding. When and if the issue is properly
presented against a proper factual background with appropriate
evidentiary material, this court can then
and only then determine
64
the reasonableness of this provision.

However, there is a line of diuthority represented by at least two
well-considered cases under the view of which the unfair practices
acts are fully within the limits of the due process requirements as
to definiteness and certainty. The earliest of these cases, State v.
Langley,65 considered the validity of the 1937 Wyoming act, which
was for all practical purposes indistinguishable from the Arizona,
New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania acts invalidated for indefiniteness. Two justices, or a majority of the court, were of the
opinion that it was unnecessary to discuss those parts of the statute
undertaking to define the cost of doing business, as the defendant
by a plea of guilty had admitted making the sale below cost for the
purposes denounced by the statute. The lower court had certified
the constitutional issues to the Wyoming Supreme Court following
defendant's motion in arrest of judgment. The author of the opinion,
however, felt that the question should be decided and devoted several pages of discussion to the matter, concluding that the statute
could be sustained. Accordingly, his remarks have the weight only
of a concurring opinion and not the force of decision.
The Wyoming justice quoted a long list of questions propounded
by the California appellate court in Balzer v. Caler as illustrative
of important unanswered problems of cost determination and indicative of fatal indefiniteness. Then he wittily reversed the process
and propounded his own series of illustrations on the thesis that
"if the legislature should attempt to do what that court [in Balzer v.
Caler] intimates it should do, a greater interference with freedom
of action would result than by the legislative act in question."6' 6 The
author of the opinion argued that all that a merchant is required
to do to comply with the provisions of the statute is to act in good
faith, determining his approximate cost according to a reasonable
method. The legislature, it was declared, must be presumed in the
absence of provisions to the contrary not to have intended to prescribe that the cost must be absolutely exact. So long as the particular method adopted by a merchant could not be shown to be
unreasonable, and did not disclose an intentional evasion of the
law, the merchant's computation would be regarded as correct under
the Wyoming justice's theory.
64(1938) 11 Cal. (2d) 634, 662, 82 P. (2d) 3, 19.
65(1938) 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P. (2d) 767.
66(1938) 53 Wyo. 332, 363, 84 P. (2d) 767, 779
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The same view was taken a year later by the Montana court in
Associated Merchants of Montana v. Ormesher.67 The court devoted most of its opinion to the questions whether the statute was
a price-fixing law, and whether it was within the police power as
an enactment reasonably designed to accomplish a valid purpose.
After upholding the act on these points, the court briefly touched
upon a final contention that the cost provisions were indefinite,
brushing the defendant's arguments aside with a quotation from the
Wyoming justice's remarks in State v. Langley. This case had
been tried to the court without a jury and the record on appeal
comprehended only the judgment roll, unaided by a factual background. State v. Sears, supra, likewise quoted from the Langley
Case and was probably to some extent influenced by the Wyoming
justice's theory.

The Wyoming and Montana cases, in accepting the acts as
sufficiently definite, inadequately handle a most troublesome problem of cost determination-that of the apportionment of overhead
expense or "cost of doing business" among the hundreds or
thousands of items constituting the stock in trade of the retail merchant. The types of questions which arise when an attempt to ap68
portion is made are illustrated by a quotation in the margin.
The dissenting judge in State v. Sears effectively answered the
Wyoming view when, speaking of the "infinite number of problems"
arising in apportionment of costs, he said:
"It does not appear to me that these problems can be resolved by
saying that the act establishes a standard of reasonableness or that
the legislature recognized that there would be a wide variation in
the accounting formulas used by those subject to the act, and inc7(1939) 107 Mont. 530, 86 P. (2d) 1031, noted in (1939) 23 Minnesota Law
Review 861.
68 "The significance of the lack of a standard for apportionment may,
however, be readily appreciated by reference to but a few of the uncertainties which arise therefrom. For example: Is rent to be apportioned
upon a basis of floor space occupied? Is this factor affected by the length
of time an article has been in the store before it is sold? When rent varies,
as it does from time to time, are goods carried over from the prior rent
level subject to apportionment on the basis of the new or the old rent
charge? Does depreciation refer to buildings and fixtures, or to stock, or
both? Are articles of stock peculiarly subject to depreciation to bear the
whole load of this item or cost, or is it to be spread over other articles not
ordinarily subject to spoilage and deterioration? Are delivery costs to
be allocated only among those articles actually delivered? Are advertising
costs to be borne entirely by particular articles advertised? . .. The conclusion that the average retailer would be unable to resolve these questions
with any reasonable degree of certainty, and that there would inevitably
be wide variations in the results of individual computations, seems inescapable." Mr. Justice Simpson, dissenting in State v. Sears, 4 Wash. (2d) 200,
238, 103 P. (2d) 337, 354.
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tended to require nothing more than that each should make a reasonable computation in good faith and not sell below that figure.
Instead it seems plain that the legislature simply failed to accord
any consideration to the problem of apportionment, that no standard
was in fact established, and that because there is no generally accepted formula commonly used by business men for this purpose the
statute should be found to be invalid. To invest the act with a
standard of conduct would, under these circumstances, be to indulge in judicial legislation. ' e' 9
Unless a standard for allocating a fixed portion of overhead
to individual items is established by the statute, or exists dehors
the statute in ascertainable form, it would seem virtually impossible
to determine whether a given merchant is violating the sales below
cost prohibition. A slight difference in their systems of overhead
cost allocation might result in justification of substantial differences
in the prices of identical commodities as between competing merchants. Shifts in the basis of cost allocation, although innocently
adopted for the purpose of achieving a more equitable accounting
basis, would bear the same indica as deliberate use of loss leaders
and would doubtless have the same effect upon competition. Should
such acts be punishable as criminal?
The cases do not and could not pretend that cost accounting systems are uniform in different businesses, or even uniform throughout single businesses. The acts surely do not indicate that they intend a freezing of accounting methods to those in use at the date
of the enactments. Since no universally accepted accounting system
covering these important details has been devised, why should any
merchant be precluded from abandoning a system he finds deficient
for any other which he may choose or invent? If only reasonable
methods are intended to be used, why is there no standard by which
the reasonableness of a particular method can be determined?
Yet should the legislature, in an effort to avoid the Scylla of an
indefinite standard for differentiation of legal and illegal acts, assume
to dictate in detail the methods by'which merchants must establish
their prices, the resulting legislation may well encounter Charybdis
in the form of Nebbia v. New York's limitation upon the extent of
the police power. It is a fair question whether the evil toward which
the unfair practices acts have been directed is such as to justify
extensive restrictions on the merchandising entrepreneur's freedom
of action. Nevertheless, in their present statutory forms, the enforcement of these acts, in the absence of a standard (either within
69(1940) 4 Wash. (2d) 200, 239, 103 P. (2d) 337, 354.
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or without the acts) for resolution of the myriad problems of apportionment of overhead expense which confront every merchant,
is so highly conjectural that, it is submitted, the prohibitions of
these acts, are too vague, arbitrary and uncertain to be supportable
under due process.
IV
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MINNESOTA AND OREGON

ACTS

A. The Issue of Intent
Mlinnesota
The present form of the Minnesota prohibition against sales
below cost, codified as 1 Minn. Stat. 1941, sec. 325.04, par. 1, forbids such sales "for the puxpose or with the effect of injuring competitors and destroying competition," and provides that a violator
is "upon conviction, subject to the penalty therefor provided in
section 325.48, subdivision 1." However, sec. 325.48, subdiv. 1 expressly limits the applicability of its penalties to violations of sec.
325.15 to 325.24 and sec. 325.25 to 325.33 which are provisions
forbidding the financing of sales of motor vehicles by manufacturers, and regulating the manufacture, renovation and sale of bedding
respectively. Perhaps the reference in sec. 325.04, par. 1 was intended to be to sec. 325.48, subdiv. 2 (1), quoted in the margin.7 0
Assuming that the penalty imposed for violation of see. 325.04
is established by sec. 325.48, subdiv. 2 (1), it would seem that the
words "wilfully violating" must be given effect in conjunction
with the intent requirements of sec. 325.04 itself. "Wilfully" is
equivalent to "knowingly" and implies that the act was done by design and with stubborn purpose but without malice.71 Since one
who wilfully or knowingly made a sale below cost "with the effect
of injuring competitors" must have intended such -an injury, apparently sec. 325.48, subdiv. 2 (1) accomplishes the virtual elimination of the words "or with the effect." Accordingly, despite the unnecessarily cumbersome approach to this construction, it would
seem that the Minnesota sales below cost provision falls within the
group of acts making strictest requirement of intent and hence is
701 Minn. Stat. 1941, sec. 325A, subdiv. 2 (1): "Any person, firm, or
corporation, whether as principal, agent, officer, or director, for himself,
or itself, or for another person, firm, or corporation, wilfully violating the
provisions of sections 325.03, 325.04, 325.05, and 325.52 shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." (Italics supplied)
71State v. Stein, (1892) 48 Minn. 466, 51 N. W. 474; Wong v. City
of Astoria, (1886) 13 Ore. 538, 11 Pac. 295; Fry v. Hubner, (1899) 35 Ore.
184, 57 Pac. 420.
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less likely to be declared unconstitutional. There is, of course, at
least a fair chance that the court will refuse to follow the circuitous path outlined and will give full meaning to the words "with
the effect," in which case the constitutionality of the act becomes
dubious.
Comparing the provisions of sec. 325.03, prohibiting locality
price discriminatioh, a clear and seemingly innocuous intent requirement will be observed: "intentionally, for the purpose of destroying the competition of any regularly established dealer or to
prevent the competition" of others intending and attempting to become dealers. However, the provisions of sec. 325.52, relating to
proof of violations, quoted in the margin,72 virtually incorporate the
qualifying words "or without the effect" into the previously clear
sec. 325.03. Nevertheless, by again applying sec. 325.48, subdiv.
2 (1) with its reference to "wilful" violations of sec. 325.03, the
dangerous implication can .be overcome. Thus construed the provision remains relatively innocuous, but the mental gymnastics necessary to achieve this result are no compliment to the draftsmanship of the Minnesota act.
Another paragraph will be found in sec. 325.04 the necessity for
which is certainly hard to explain. Although a very full and inclusive
provision, sec. 325.03, had already been devoted to prohibition of
locality price discrimination, and though an adequately comprehensive prohibition of sales below cost comprised paragraph one
of sec. 325.04, the second paragraph reads:
"Any retailer or wholesaler who sells goods in any part of this
state at prices lower than those exacted by the person elsewhere in
the state for like qualities and grades and where the effect of such
lower prices may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of business, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with the person selling at such lower prices,
shall be guilty of unfair competition and subject to the penalties of
section 325.48, subdivision 1; provided, that nothing shall prevent
differentials in prices in different localities which make only due
allowances for differences in 'cost of doing business' or 'overhead
expense' and in costs of delivery for such goods to different localities; nor differences in prices made in good faith to meet legal
competition of any other person in such locality."
721 Minn. Stat. 1941, sec. 325.52: "Any sale made by the retail vendor
at less than eight per cent above the manufacturer's published list price,
less his published discounts, where the manufacturer publishes a list price;
or, in the absence of such a list price, at less than eight per cent above the
actual current delivered invoice or replacement cost, for the purpose or with
the effect of injuring competitors or destroying competition, shall be prima
facie evidence of the violation of sections 325.02 to 325.07." (Italics supplied)
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The reference intended by the words first italicized is doubtful:
do they indicate the retail or wholesale vendor himself (thus prohibiting sales below cost) or do they indicate the person referred
to in the second group of italicized words, a competitor (thus prohibiting locality discrimination) ? It will be noted also that the intent requirement is still different than the two kinds of provisions
just observed in sec. 325.03 and sec. 325.04, par. 1. This reads:
"where the effect ...

may be substantially to lessen competition,"

etc., and, unless aided by sec. 325.48, subdiv. 2 (1), would undoubtedly fall under the theory of State ex rel., English v. Ruback.73 The third paragraph of sec. 325.04 tends to support the conclusion that the second paragraph (probably unnecessary in view
of its duplication of the last sentence in sec. 325.03) was intended
to deal with locality discrimination, but even this is dubious. This
paragraph can be said generally to add little to the definiteness of
the act.
Oregon
The Oregon sales below cost prohibition, sec. 43-104, 0. C. L. A.
1940, is clearer in its intent requirement than the Ainnesota act but
probably less supportable. The section prohibits below cost sales:
"where the effect of such sale below cost . . . may lessen, injure,

destroy, prevent, hinder or suppress the competition of competitors
of such person engaged in business within this state." The penalty
provision, sec. 43-111, 0. C. L. A. 1940, rather stringent in that it
decrees punishment for each single violation by fine of "not less
than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred
dollars ($500)" or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or
both, contains no qualifying words comparable to these of MXinnesota's sec. 325.48, subdiv. 2 (1).
Under sec. 43-104 a merchant might be held to a fairly substantial fine if he sold goods below cost, although he had no guilty
intent and even no knowledge that his sales would have an adverse
effect upon a competitor. The presence of the word "may" according to the Ruback Case broadens the prohibition to include not only
all reasonably probable consequences but also all conceivable results. The long series of similar but not identical verbs increases
the breadth of the prohibitive clause. Further-although the reference of the italicized phrase is not clear-if, as seems likely, it
modifies competitor (rather than vendor) the person injured by
the merchant's below cost sale could be located anywhere within
73 Supra, footnote 31.
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Oregon. Good faith on the part of the merchant would be no defense to a prosecution if the court should find the sale might hinder
or injure a distant person not regarded by the merchant himself as
a competitor. The Daniel Loughran Co. "Case held a similar provision to be unreasonable.
Oregon's provision prohibiting locality price discrimination,
sec. 43-102 (a), 0. C. L. A. 1940, contains a similarly unrestricted
intent requirement. Accordingly, the Oregon Anti-price Discrimination Act must be regarded as a member of the group of statutes
least likely to be found constitutional because of the absence of a
more restricted intent requirement, particularly if any other provisions are found to be indefinite.
B. The Issue of Indefiniteness and Uncertainty
Minnesota
In weighing the definiteness of the definition of "cost of doing
business" in sec. 325.01, subdiv. 7, the interpretation of the intent
provision above discussed is important. If a construction of sec.
325.04 is adopted which predicates a violation upon an injurious
effect on competitors irrespective of the merchant's subjective intent to injure, the absolutism of the cost definition, allowing no
room for good faith discrepancies in the merchant's and the courts'
computations, probably would render the act invalid.
However, regardless of the nature of intent necessary to constitute a violation, there is a defect in sec. 325.01, subdiv. 7, which
is more likely to be serious. In common with every unfair practice
act which has been examined, the Minnesota act fails to make any
attempt to indicate the method of apportioning overhead expense
among the numerous items on sale. Sec. 325.52, quoted above,
makes an inept approach toward the setting of a standard by providing that any sale by a retail vendor at less than eight per cent
(two per cent for wholesale vendors) of the constituent elements
in the term "cost" as defined in sec. 325.01, subdiv. 5, shall be
prima facie evidence of violation. In the absence of a recognizable
way to rebut this prima facie case by showing the cost of doing
business with respect to a single article, the eight per cent would
necessarily become the "cost of doing business" within the meaning of the act. Blind adherence to this eight per cent mark-up, in
many of the variant types of businesses covered by the act, is cer-
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tainly arbitrary and bears7 4no reasonable relation to the ultimate
fact of violation of the act.

"Replacement cost," the meaning of which is essential in computation of permissible sales prices, is not defined in the act. Many
of the acts do define this term and at least two of these definitions
were disapproved because they were uncertain or unreasonable. It
may well be doubted whether the words have such a well-defined
business significance that definition was unnecessary. Indeed, that
those concerned with the act are in doubt over this matter has
already been demonstrated.7 5 Sec. 325.05 bears upon replacement
cost by indirection where it forbids a merchant to use the invoice
cost of merchandise purchased at a "sale outside of the ordinary
channels of trade" to justify a price lower than one "based upon
the replacement cost as of the date of the sale of the.., merchandise
replaced through the ordinary channels of trade," unless certain
precautions are taken to advise the public. If the good faith of a
merchant is immaterial, determination of what constitutes a sale
outside of "the ordinary channels of trade" may place on him a
considerable burden. It will be observed that the provisions of the
section are absolute in their mandate and the rule of the Daniel
Loughran Co. Case will apply unless sec. 325.48, subdiv. 2 (1)
alleviates the harshness of sec. 325.05.
The last phrase in the Minnesota act which will be noticed is
sec. 325.06 (4), exempting from the act sales below cost made:
"In an endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal prices of a
competitor selling the same commodity . . .in the same locality or

trade area." The indefiniteness of this provision has been discussed above. A similar phrase included in the locality discrimination provision, sec. 325.03, which substitutes the words "local competition" for "legal prices of a competitor," probably achieves no
greater certainty.
Oregon

Sec. 43-104 (b), 0. C. L. A. 1940 defining "cost of doing busi-Cf. State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., (1938) 203 Minn. 438,
443, 281 N. W. 753, 755. Here the lack of a standard of apportionment of
the items comprising the "actual cost of transportation" was one of the
reasons for declaring unconstitutional a 1937 statute disapproving locality
price discrimination by buyers of farm products for manufacture or sale.
7-'Attorney-General Burnquist, called upon in July 1941 by the Duluth
city attorney, gave his opinion that "replacement cost must necessarily be
the present existing price, which may be the price from day to day."
Reports of Minnesota Attorney-General, 1941-42, Opinion 349, pp. 501-502
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ness" is quoted in the margin. 76 It will be observed that whatever
definiteness is imparted by an enumeration of certain mandatory
items of expense is confined to the case of a person engaged in
business within the state for a period of time shorter than 12
months. Turning then to the italicized phrase, which alone must
control in all other cases, it is apparent that the phrase closely
approximates the language of the Minnesota statute held invalid
in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.Ervin.77 Accordingly, since

the merchant is precluded from showing his actual current cost
of doing business, where it varies from the yearly average, the
provision is unreasonable under the theory of the Ervin Case.
In case he is a "retailer in food commerce" the merchant in
computing his overhead expense may, under sec. 43-104 (c),
choose the lower of (1) 6% of replacement cost, or (2) the average monthly cost of doing business during the 12 months preceding an alleged violation of the act. This provision is supplemented
by sec. 43-101 (4) defining replacement cost, quoted in the margin.7 8 The latter definition is superior to the definitions invalidated
in the Zasloff and Packard-BambergerCases in that the merchant

is not required to investigate the entire market to determine the
most favorable market price, but need only find a single outlet at
which he could have bought the merchandise in question. The
period of time involved in his investigation is only a third as long
as that in the Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases, thus that portion
of his burden is also less. These considerations may well be sufficient
to distinguish those cases. The Oregon Attorney-General, consider76 Sec. 43-104 (b), 0. C. L. A. 1940: "For the purpose of this section,
the phrase 'cost of doing business' or 'overhead expense' is defined as the
average of all costs of doing business incurredin the conduct of such business
during the 12 months immediately preceding any alleged violation of this
act or in the event any person shall be engaged in business within the state
for a shorter period of time, in that event the average cost for such period
immediately preceding any alleged violation of this act must include without limitation the following items of expense: Labor (including salaries
of executives and officers), rent, interest on borrowed capital, depreciation,
selling cost, maintenance of equipment, buildings and fixtures, transportation a'd delivery costs, as fixed under tariffs approved by the public
utilities commissioner of the state of Oregon, light, heat, power and water.
credit losses, all types of licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising." (Italics
supplied)
77Supra,
footnote 31.
78
Sec. 43-101 (e), 0. C. L. A. 1940: "The term 'replacement cost' shall
mean the cost per unit at the retail outlet at which the merchandise sold or
offered for sale could have been bought by the seller at any time within
ten (10) days prior to the date of sale or the date upon which it is offered
for sale by the seller, if bought in the same quantities as the seller's usual
or customary purchase of the said merchandise, after deducting all discounts,
rebates, or other price concessions."
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ing this provision in the bill before its enactment into law, gave
his opinion that the 6% figure was not arbitrary but was reasonable,
if the merchant desired to use it instead of the figure reflected by
his books. But linked as it is with what is probably an invalid clause,
the average cost provision, it is doubtful whether the section could
be saved even if the attorney-general's position be accepted.
The difficulty of apportionment of overhead expense among
salable items, referred to above in discussion of indefiniteness of
the Minnesota act, is not met by the Oregon statute. Another
uncertainty problem common to both the Minnesota and Oregon
statutes arises from the exclusion from the cost computation of
sales "outside of the ordinary channels of trade," Oregon's provision appearing in sec. 43-105, 0. C. L. A. 1940.
V.
CONCLUSION

When the issue of constitutionality of the Oregon Anti-price
Discrimination Act and of the Minnesota Unfair Trade Practices
Act is squarely presented to a court having jurisdiction thereof,
it is difficult to see how any conclusion can be reached except the
unconstitutionality of both. Without exception, every case which
has sustained the sales below cost provisions of an unfair practices
act has been based upon a record factually incomplete, the issue
having arisen upon demurrer, motion, or certified question. Under
those circumstances the courts' reluctance to pronounce a violation
of the principles of due process is understandable, and in some instances may have been justifiable. Other courts, in contrast, have
not needed the elucidation of a factual record of the nearly insuperable obstacles confronting a merchant who attempts to comply
with these statutes.
It appears that the view taken by part of the Wyoming court
is unsound, in that it is premised upon the supposition that "simple"
accounting methods provide a uniform and acceptable standard
dehors the statute for governing mercantile cost practices. 79 That
supposition seems ill-founded in view of the prevalent doubt over
79
Cf. State v. Langley, (1938) 53 Wyo. 332, 363-364: "The legislature,
doubtless, had such general business methods-reasonable standards of cost
accounting for the various classes of business-in mind and believed them to
exist. If they do not exist-if cost cannot be ascertained-then the act in question should be held to be unconstitutional. If, on the other hand, the cost is
ascertainable, under reasonable methods, then such cost is purely a question
of fact, definite and certain, and the standard of conduct set by the legislature,
too, is definite and certain."
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proper methods of apportionment of overhead costs. The deficiency,
common to the unfair practice acts, is one not readily overcome by
statutory amendment. It may be that it will be necessary to eliminate the concept of "cost of doing business" to avoid the detailed
investigations and computations which make cumbersome both
obedience to and enforcement of the sales below cost provisions.
Yet, theoretically, it is more fair to consider overhead. It is probably unreasonable to establish an arbitrary mark-up figure by
which to increase the actual cost traceable directly to the goods
themselves.
Presumably there will be a resumption of the activity of the
forces which brought this legislation into being with the termination of the war-frozen price economy. It will be interesting to
observe how legislative and judicial ingenuity will balance the demand with constitutional necessities.

